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ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE THE THREE
FINDINGS NECESSARY TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S
FEES UNDER SEC. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953
In its brief Appellants set forth in some detail
on pages 9-12 the teachings of Cady v. Johnson, 671 P2d 149
(Utah, 1983) that there must be three "distinct findings11
to sustain an award of attorney's fees under the subject
statute.

Respondents do not take issue with Appellants

reading of Cady.

To the contrary they state "three

conditions must be met before a court may impose attorneyfs
fees under Sec. 78-27-56" p. 21. They then set forth the
same findings referred to above.

In the next nine pages

respondents set forth factors which they claim would
sustain such findings but they never claim that any such
findings were made by the trial court.

Obviously no such

findings were made as there is only one "finding" set forth
by the trial court which related to Sec. 78-27-56 (1) and
that related solely to the reasonableness of the amount of
the award (R. 427). The version of the applicable finding
set forth in respondents1 brief (No. 1 on p. 7 ) , which is
not the same wording as the courtfs, only finds that an
award of $10,000.00 in bad faith attorney's fee were made
against plaintiff.

The court's finding consisted of only

16 words in addition to the citation and there are only 12
words including three articles in respondents' version of
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that finding.

Neither version could possibly set forth all

three of the essential findings.
Without waiving the defects as to the other two
findings, Appellants will canvas the basis for any findings
that Plaintiff! s claims were

lf

without merit11 (lfB" on p.

21-24 of Respondents1 brief).
Respondents first contend that "the defendants
unrebutted evidence at trial fully supports the finding
that there was a complete lack of merit to plaintiff's
claims.11

This ipse dixit statement is simply not so as no

one so testified and there was no such finding made.
What defendants1 witnesses testified to in effect
was that the extent of injuries could not have been as
great a^s they believed plaintiff was claiming.

If one is

claiming injuries which justify an award of $50,000.00 or
more obviously the accident and injuries must be much more
severe than if the injuries claimed were the basis of a
claim for $5,000.00. The fact that defendants' witnesses
testify that in their opinion the injuries would not
support the former (which they erroneously believed was
plaintiff's claim) does not mean that those injuries do not
support the later or any claim less than that down to
nothing.

Even if the injuries were only sufficient to

support nominal damages the testimony with respect to such
injuries would not be wholly without merit.

Henry Ford

once won a libel suit and a jury verdict of $1.00 (or was
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it $0.01?).

The jury obviously did not think the libel

harmed him but can it be said that his claim was "without
merit'1?

If evidence only sufficient to sustain nominal

damages created liability for bad faith attorney's fees
then the statute creating such liability should clearly so
state.

Otherwise an affirmance of this award amounts to

judicial amendment of that statute.

"Without merit11 surely

excludes a claim for nominal damages as well as substantial
damages.
Respondents do not contend in their brief on this
point that Dr. Luers and Dr. Fogg testified that the bus
accident did not cause any injuries but only that the bus
accident did not cause the injuries "that plaintiff
claimed" (i.e., major injuries).

Thus their testimony is

not proof that plaintiff's claim was "without merit" in
their opinion but only that it merited only a minor claim
consideration or nominal damages, hence a matter of
relativity.
As for plaintiff's "dramatic change of position"
at the conclusion of the case the respondents provide no
basis for comparison and do not state what the ending
position is compared with.
the case?

With the pleadings that started

With the opening statement?

With what?

Rather

than condemning plaintiff tor his counsel's realistic
assessment at the conclusion of the case such candor should
be acknowledged and encouraged.
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Certainly that

acknowledgment that the evidence did not justify an award
for major damages is not a concession that the evidence
does not justify an award for minor or minimal injuries.
Appellants object to respondents supporting their
position by going outside the record in this case in
quoting from a deposition testimony that was not introduced
into evidence in the trial itself (note No, 9 on p. 23) and
more critically the analysis of plaintiff's deposition
testimony on p. 26 which was not before the judge and jury
at the trial.
If plaintifffs claim had some merit, however
slight, to support the claim he finally made in this case,
then his claim was not without merit.

The objective proof

of that minimal amount of merit is found in the fact that
the jury found the defendant driver was negligent in
connection with the rear-end accident involved in this case
(R. 321) and the testimony of respondents1 expert, Dr.
Fogg, who testifies that in his opinion plaintiff suffered
minimal injuries as a result of the accident in question
(R. 509, p. 230, 231). Had the jury rendered a verdict for
a small sum based on that evidence it would surely have
withstood any appellate claim that the verdict was not
supported by the evidence.
It is significant that respondents have not
challenged the contention of appellant as to the meaning of
"without merit11 as being "frivolous11 which was defined in
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Cady v. Johnson, 671 P2d 149 (Utah, 1983) as being "of
little weight or importance, having no basis in law or
fact" nor do they deny that the resources they used in
defending this cause shows that they themselves considered
the claims in question to be one of great importance.
If plaintifffs claims were totally devoid of merit
the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of
defendants at the conclusion of the case.

Instead he took

defendants1 motion for dismissal under advisement and
allowed the case to proceed to a jury verdict after
instruction, argument and deliberation which extended the
trial to the next day and consumed half of a day in the
process (R. 509, p. 252).
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPLYING
THAT HANSEN DID NOT READ A DOCUMENT
OR SIGNED IT WITHOUT A REASONABLE
INQUIRY AS TO ITS MERITS IN FACT
AND LAW
Respondents contend (p. 30) that "Hansen did
nothing more than request a copy of the investigating
officerfs report of the earlier accident" (R. 378). This
simply is not true. The fact is that Hansen confronted
client with his opinion that it was obvious the truck had
been is a prior accident (R. 392-414).

This is proof

positive that he did not "chose to ignore the significance
of the photographs of the accidents" (p. 30). He learned
thereby that the damages were under $300.00 for the first
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accident and over $900.00 for the second accident, facts
which are undisputed in the evidence (Addendum i and ii)
and which significant facts are totally ignored in
respondents1 brief despite their being emphasized in
appellants1 Brief (see p. 2, last paragraph and p. 3; also
p. 16, last paragraph).
Respondents contend that Hansen's investigation
was not a reasonable one because he should have examined
the medical records and radiographs of his client's experts
as they would have "conclusively established the bad faith
and lack of merit in his client's claims" (p« 31). This is
ridiculous.
evidence.

Hansen has no competence to evaluate medical

Surely an objection would be properly sustained

if he ever ventured to express any medical opinion and
especially one as technical as the one just referred to.
Respondents claim that the trial court determined
that "Hansen failed to meet the 'reasonable inquiry'
standard required by Rule 11" (p. 33). This ipse dixit
assertion has no support in the record.

In fact the trial

court made no express finding regarding any inquiry (R.
427).

On the contrary the trial judge substituted the

"could or should have sensed" standard for the "reasonable
inquiry" standard as noted in Appellants' brief at p. 14.
Nowhere is this addressed in the Respondents' brief.
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Ill
THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS OR FOR
PURPOSES OF DELAY AND THUS NOT
VIOLATIVE OF RULE 33 OR RULE 40
It is not true, as asserted by Respondents on page
34, that appellants "are doing little more than re-arguing
their case on appeal.11

The fact of the matter is that

there has never been an argument on these issues before the
trial court despite appellant's request for such an
argument (R. 415).
It is also not true that the trial court made a
finding that "Hansen failed to make a reasonable inquiry.11
As to Hansen the finding only stated that he "could or
should have sensed the nature and lack of merit in the
case..." (R. 427), a wholly different fault and one not
embraced within Rule 11 .
Such disparity between Respondents1 brief and the
record amply j ustifies that appeal. Additionally the
factual errors in those brief findings are so flagrant as
to raise concern as to the care with which they were
reached, namely (1) the State was never a party to this
action.

Counsel for Respondents represented the Granite

School District and one of its bus drivers. The fact that
those same attorneys usually do represent the State does
not alter their representation in this action and (2) the
fact that the disclosure meeting of counsel occurred on
August 9, 1988 (not August 3) -- see Respondents1 Brief, p.
10.
-7-

Other sound bases for the appeal are set forth
under I and II above.
Respondents erroneously contend that "the record
in support of these findings is so strong and the grounds
for this appeal so flimsy" that delay could only be its
purpose.

The record can not support a nonexistent finding,

however, and the characterization of the appeal weight is
simply an ipse dixit assertion which makes no attempt to
connect any evidence in the record with a finding of a
legally insufficient "reasonable inquiry" required by Rule
11 •
By simply ignoring much of the substance of
appellant!s brief the respondents seek to avoid giving it
the serious attention it should be given.

For instance

appellant's brief pointed out that the instant case was
distinguishable from Takip v. Thurber, 739 P2d 1101 (Utah,
1987) in that there the sanctioned party "testified
falsely" (p. 12) and respondents1 brief claimed that the
plaintiff here testified falsely in his deposition before
trial (p. 26) and ignored the explanation plaintiff made
concerning that deposition (Appellant's Brief, p. 3) and
even more importantly ignored the admitted facts that the
prior accident damages were under $300.00 and the second
one were over $900.00 (Addendum i and ii).
Another glaring failure to address the real issues
in this appeal is the fact that under 1(B) dealing with
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"without merit" (Respondents' Brief, p. 21) nothing is said
with respect to these critical factors regarding that issue
set forth in Appellant's Brief pages 10-12:

(1) definition

of "without merit", (2) no express finding of this fact as
required by Cady, a case Respondents' rely on, (3)
Appellant Jeschke's motion for summary judgment, (4) 52
interrogatories, (5) eight hours of deposition of
plaintiff, (6) seven hours of deposition of Dr. Burns, (7)
expert witness fees of $10,000.00, (8) the trial court's
taking defendants' motion for a directed verdict under
advisement, all of which should be considered in
determining whether a case is without merit.
Respondents also ignored the argument set forth by
appellant Hansen on page 18 of his brief.

This is

particularly significant because Rule 11 has as its main
purpose to discourage litigation, not to cause it.
Finally, it is highly significant that respondents
made no attempt to rebut Hansen's argument under Point II
on page 13 that (1) the certification which was allegedly
in violation of Rule 11 was not specified in the motion,
(2) that Rule 11 is not invoked by one party giving notice
of facts to the other, (3) that there is no evidence in the
record that no inquiry or an inadequate inquiry was made
with respect to the informal notice in question.
Certainly an appeal is not frivolous which seeks
to confine Rule 11 sanctions to certifications which
violate that rule.
-9-

Under this point respondents urge this Court to
impose additional sanctions because "Hansen has further
misstated and mischaracterized the evidence...11 (regarding
withdrawal) claiming that the "transcript of the
on-the-record meeting in the judge's chamber shows that
Hansen's assertion is false.11

This is clearly a false

assertion by Ogilvie as an examination of that transcript
shows no such proof.

The transcript itself shows that the

court and counsel had two oft-the-record discussions on
that date, one before the recording began (R. 511, p. 18)
and one during the recording (R. 511, p. 17). Thus the
only evidence in the record on this point is the affidavit
of Hansen that such occurred (R. 395, para. 18) although it
was in error as to its being "on the record".

The near

certainty that no judge would compel an attorney to proceed
to trial where to do so would violate his ethical standards
gives rise to an inference in support of that affidavit.
CONCLUSION
The judgments appealed from herein should be
reversed and vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of September,
1990.

y^~\

Robert B. Hansen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 11th day of
September, 1990, four true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed by the
undersigned to Edward 0. Ogilvie, Reed M. Stringham,
Assistant Attorney Generals, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, Attorneys for Respondents.

Robert B. Hansen
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ADDENDUM

Photocopy of R. 508, p. 38
(testimony regarding truck
damage from first accident,
truck damages from second
accident, one involved in
this suit)

A

I BELIEVE IT WAS A LITTLE OVER A YEAR.

Q

AND DURING THAT YEAR'S TIME HAD IT EVER BEEN

IN AN ACCIDENT WHETHER YOU WERE IN IT OR NOT?

A

YES* IT WAS.

Q

AND CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THAT?

A

I WAS AT WORK AT THE FAIRMONT BOWLING ALLEY AND

THE TRUCK WAS PARKED ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE BOWLING ALLEY
RIGHT OUT IN FRONT OF THE DOORS.

AND I WENT OUT TO--THAT

OUR WORK TRUCK WAS PARKED DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF IT--AND I
WENT OUTSIDE TO GET SOME PART OUT OF THE TRUCK AND I NOTICED
MY TRUCK HAD BEEN PUSHED INTO THE WORK TRUCK AND I LOOKED
AT IT CLOSER AND IT HAD BEEN HIT AND RUN.
Q

DID YOU GET COMPENSATED FOR THAT?

A

YES, I DID.

Q

HOW MUCH?

A

A LITTLE UNDER $300.00.

Q

DID YOU GET THOSE DAMAGES REPAIRED THEN?

A

SOME OF THEM, YES.

Q

WHAT DID YOU GET REPAIRED?

A

I REPAIRED THE BUMPER.

Q

HAVE YOU GOTTEN COMPENSATED FOR THE DAMAGE TO

I BELIEVE THAT WAS IT.

YOUR VEHICLE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ACCIDENT?
A

YES, I WAS.

Q

HOW MUCH DID YOU GET?

A

THE ESTIMATE WAS FOR $1,100 BUT I DON'T RECALL,

38
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ADDENDUM

Photocopy of Exhibits 9-D, 10-D
(truck damages from second
accident, the one involved in
this suit)
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